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26 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : DD/P Memorandum of 3 July 1964

1. You have requested my comments on the personal and informal memorandum dated 3 July 1964 from Mr. Helms which you gave me to read. In general I should say that I am sympathetic to, and understanding of, some of the concern of the Clandestine Services on these matters. I feel that it is indisputable that every effort should be made to preserve the privacy or security of operations, and I think that as an Agency we should hammer home the need-to-know principle and keep the knowledge of operations as closely confined to the DD/P as possible. I think we all recognize that the DD/P has expended assets in the militant phases of the cold war, and in many instances it will be difficult for a long time before some of these assets are required. Occasionally the decisions to expend these assets were beyond the Agency's control.

2. On the other hand, I might dispute one of the reasons which Mr. Helms produces for the problems that the Clandestine Services are worried about. He cites "an ominous drift from close compartmentation" and a drive toward centralization and conventional mode of conducting affairs. I don't know exactly what drift from close compartmentation he has in mind. I am unaware of any discussions of operations at the morning meetings--or at least they are very rare--and I was under the impression that Mr. Helms took up operational matters privately with you and the DCI. This is both appropriate and wise, although it does leave me a little in the cold and I feel a dangerous ignorance of operational activities. Here I would stress that I have no desire to know the identity or locale of operations except in a general way but I do feel that as Executive Director I must be informed, and as Comptroller I should have knowledge of the use of manpower and funds. The only drive towards centralization that I am aware of has been in the financial and manpower fields, and I believe that this has not in any way either lessened the DD/P's internal authority or decreased security in that area. Further, I must confess that I am not aware of an insistence that the DD/P follow a conventional mode of conducting affairs, and in fact I have always tried to break down any effort to force clandestine operations into the usual governmental mold because this is inconsistent with the philosophy of clandestinity. He also speaks of the

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trend toward institutionalization of our Agency bureaucracy and notes that it must be forestalled and reversed. Again, I would like specifics and if these specifics are the ones detailed in the memorandum shown to you and myself by Mr. Karamessines, then I feel that this description overstates the case and I believe my record in opposing "institutionalization" in CIA is clear.

50X1 3. Mr. Helms then talks about the protection of people, methods and contents in using the common support structure and is concerned about overt and covert taking the same training courses. This was one of the specifics in the memorandum shown us by Mr. Karamessines and, as I told him then, there is no reason why truly covert personnel cannot be given training courses by themselves provided they are truly covert. If, on the other hand, these people are staff employees who have served or will serve [redacted] abroad where their identity as CIA will become well-known, and who conduct liaison with or represent the Agency in any way with outside organizations, Government or otherwise, then I find it difficult to appreciate the rationale as to why they cannot be exposed to other CIA personnel, all of whom are cleared at the identical level. I suggested to Tom that perhaps what is needed--rather than segregation--is better orientation of the personnel of the other Directorates on protecting the identity of their DD/P compatriots. I have suggested that we adopt an Agency-wide policy and hammer it into our people from the day they enter on duty that you never answer an outsider who asks, "Do you know [redacted] in CIA?" I have followed this practice for years with both family and friends, and if the outsider is trying to locate an individual, my consistent answer is that I don't know the individual but I will see what I can do. I then call the individual concerned and advise him that he is being inquired after and leave with him the initiative as to responding to the inquiry. If we all did this we could probably help submerge the identity of Clandestine Services personnel without looking silly in the consequence. But I do want to stress that the Clandestine Services must be consistent in this regard and not be impractical in insisting that their personnel who are exposed repeatedly to other U.S. Government personnel and foreign government personnel for what they are be shielded from our own personnel.

4. The DD/P also is worried about CIA regulatory material. This too was in the Karamessines memo, and I am in agreement with them that we should make every effort to have this as simple, succinct and practical as possible. I do not believe that there will be any resistance to this anywhere in the Agency. I would note that the DD/S has made a conscientious and determined effort to achieve this, including the "miniaturization" of regulatory material into shorter form and smaller notebooks

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for use in field stations. I will be happy to work with the DD/P and DD/S along this line, and I hope that the Clandestine Services Instructions can also be kept at a minimum and simple.

5. The memorandum shown me by Mr. Karamessines, in addition to the above, also expressed concern about increased personnel using the DD/P corridors in the headquarters building and the dangers of surveillance of our parking lots to acquire information on licenses and to check the identities of our personnel. I have personally talked to the Director of Security about this and they are studying what tightening up should be achieved, but I would note my conviction that the DD/P receives considerable protection and cover by being in a building in which they are approximately of the total personnel. I believe that if hostile intelligence wants to list every license plate in our parking lots, they would be facing a vast problem of identification and expending considerable wasted effort. I believe the targetting towards us will be much more professional and precise, namely penetration.


6. What the DD/P does not say, but what I feel must lie to a very large degree behind these problems and the specifics raised by Mr. Karamessines, is really whether there should be a CIA which incorporates a research organization, a scientific and technical organization, the clandestine services and a common support organization. You will recall that the history of our evolution was one in which our original clandestine office, the Office of Special Operations, engaged in espionage and counter-espionage, had its integrated support facilities--its own personnel division, training staff, communications organization, etc. The support organizations were broken out of OSO at the time that CIA started to explode in size and at a time when the spans of command were broadening beyond practical and efficient management. This was a period when General Smith decided to go from a horizontal line organization to a vertical organization with Deputy Directors responsible for broad areas, and our support mechanism was established as a more efficient way to do business. There has continued to remain logically and reasonably in the Clandestine Services schools of thought which would like to return to the previous system of a totally integrated organization. This is not wholly practical today because the Congress would never understand a multiplicity of support organizations, and if the Clandestine Services were to remain in CIA then common support structure is logical. Looking at it from quite a different aspect, I believe that the common relationship between our Directorates and mutually supporting activities, in business between the DD/S and DD/P, but also including DD/I and DD/S&T, General Counsel and Inspector General, is such that we have achieved a unique and efficient structure. Further, I am quite convinced that if we would integrate the support services into the DD/P,

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we would be inviting the fragmentation and destruction of CIA with the Clandestine Services being gobbled up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DD/S&T disbanded, and the DD/I going to the Department of State where it would meet the same fate as its predecessor organization, OSS's Research and Analysis Branch, which is basically no longer an intelligence organization in INR. While I would be the last to wish to suppress creative thinking in the Agency, I would suggest that if the DD/P really feels a comprehensive study in depth of this subject is warranted, we should do it on an Agency basis with participation of the DD/P and accurate reflection of their views. I say this in full knowledge that as an Agency we have strength, but as individual components we are just fresh meat to the wolves of Washington.

7. My final comment would be that I believe there is nothing irreconcilable in what the DD/P wants and what can be done, and, as you know, Mr. Karamessines has initiated discussion with each of the components involved to get their views.


Man B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

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Read and noted
by Gen. Carter 3 July

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
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PERSONAL AND INFORMAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

1. In line with our conversation of last week, I would like to bring to your attention the trend which, if it continues, will endanger the operational capability and capacity of the Clandestine Services to perform its operational mission. This memorandum does not make specific recommendations but rather is submitted as the basis for future conversations between us, looking toward the actions necessary to preserve the privacy and secrecy of our covert operations. It points up the need for managerial and procedural flexibility in proper combination with the maintenance of the strict operational standards which are the sine qua non of our viability.

2. The uncomfortable position in which CIA finds itself as the result of recent disclosures in public print has impelled members of my staff to raise certain cogent questions deriving from the self-imposed evaluation that has been going on for some months within the Clandestine Services. We have recognized that many of our CS assets have been expended over the last dozen years in the more militant phases of the cold war. Now, in many parts of the world, we are faced with an even more subtle type of engagement wherein the effectiveness of every covert resource must be preserved and stretched to the utmost. It is a time for maximum protection of sources and methods. Yet as matters are evolving within CIA, my senior officers perceive an ominous drift away from the concept of close compartmentation which was and is the very keystone of our CS discipline and a drive toward a centralized and conventional mode of conducting affairs, wherein privacy and secrecy have little footing. This trend toward the institutionalization of our Agency bureaucracy must be forestalled and reversed. The process is complicated by a certain ambiguity which presently envelops the lines of responsibility and authority within the Agency.



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3. Among the differently oriented entities, -- some covert, most overt, -- impounded in a common structure as is the case in CIA, all standards tend inevitably to level off at the least common denominator; that was and is the case for compartmentation. Witness:

(1) In our dichotomous "open and closed" CIA organization, there is apparently a failure to recognize that the concepts in regard to clandestine operations which require protection of people, methods and content do not equate with the concepts of the overt components where content is of major concern.

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(3) CIA regulatory material is promulgated for application both to the overt and covert organizational structure. Both in volume and intricacy, it is moving toward a state of unmanageability, particularly in our foreign field organization where personnel conducting unconventional operations are encumbered with an overabundance of administrative instructions, rules and regulations. As a result, our overseas personnel devote an excessive amount of their valuable man-hours to the technical aspects of administration.

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(4) Headquarters as far as the CS is concerned, unlike other Agency components, is not, itself, the end but is the directing and supporting framework for the clandestine field force. It is the center in and around which covert personnel find intermittence between foreign assignments, and increase their level of knowledge and training in anticipation of future service overseas. The one CIA family concept as it

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4. My staff is moved by a deep desire to correct those practices which unnecessarily are making operations more burdensome and are contributing to the depletion of our resources. We are moved also by a deep apprehension that, unless the present trend is reversed, the time will fast run out when we can discharge our espionage and counter-espionage mission and fulfill our covert action role with the degree of success expected by the Director, the Congress and the President. Our purpose in coming to you at this time, after many months of deliberation on our problems, is solely because we seek to provide to the United States Government a Clandestine Service in fact as well as in name. A determination by yourself giving precedence and paramountcy within CIA to that objective will serve to give us the authority we need to make a careful study of the actions necessary to realize our aims.

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Richard Helms

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